Armageddon is about to begin...

Xtractorfan

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So a nuclear attack or the threat of one is imminent, its touch and go.
When do we decide to push the button....
We could fire a first salvo in a pre-emptive attack.
Discuss.
 

Frontstep

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The question is context so lets have two scenarios May as Prime Minister or Corbyn.
May gives the impression that she will "push the button if attacked".
Corbyn gives the impression he won't.

So as General Frontstep the worlds newest crackpot dictator I have stumbled across some N Korean weaponry that I can aim at whoever upsets me.

Aim at General May or Captain Corbyn hmm............

Would I push the "button" depends entirely on circumstance but hopefully before they do.
 

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I did this in some detail a while back, but here it is again. These essays are written by a chap who does nuclear targeteering for a living.

When a country first acquires nuclear weapons it does so out of a very accurate perception that possession of nukes fundamentally changes it relationships with other powers. What nuclear weapons buy for a New Nuclear Power (NNP) is the fact that once the country in question has nuclear weapons, it cannot be beaten. It can be defeated, that is it can be prevented from achieving certain goals or stopped from following certain courses of action, but it cannot be beaten. It will never have enemy tanks moving down the streets of its capital, it will never have its national treasures looted and its citizens forced into servitude. The enemy will be destroyed by nuclear attack first. A potential enemy knows that so will not push the situation to the point where our NNP is on the verge of being beaten. In effect, the effect of acquiring nuclear weapons is that the owning country has set limits on any conflict in which it is involved. This is such an immensely attractive option that states find it irresistible.

Only later do they realize the problem. Nuclear weapons are so immensely destructive that they mean a country can be totally destroyed by their use. Although our NNP cannot be beaten by an enemy it can be destroyed by that enemy. Although a beaten country can pick itself up and recover, the chances of a country devastated by nuclear strikes doing the same are virtually non-existant. [This needs some elaboration. Given the likely scale and effects of a nuclear attack, its most unlikely that the everybody will be killed. There will be survivors and they will rebuild a society but it will have nothing in common with what was there before. So, to all intents and purposes, once a society initiates a nuclear exchange its gone forever]. Once this basic factor has been absorbed, the NNP makes a fundamental realization that will influence every move it makes from this point onwards. If it does nothing, its effectively invincible. If, however, it does something, there is a serious risk that it will initiate a chain of events that will eventually lead to a nuclear holocaust. The result of that terrifying realization is strategic paralysis.

With that appreciation of strategic paralysis comes an even worse problem. A non-nuclear country has a wide range of options for its forces. Although its actions may incur a risk of being beaten they do not court destruction. Thus, a non-nuclear nation can afford to take risks of a calculated nature. However, a nuclear-equipped nation has to consider the risk that actions by its conventional forces will lead to a situation where it may have to use its nuclear forces with the resulting holocaust. Therefore, not only are its strategic nuclear options restricted by its possession of nuclear weapons, so are its tactical and operational options. So we add tactical and operational paralysis to the strategic variety. This is why we see such a tremendous emphasis on the mechanics of decision making in nuclear powers. Every decision has to be thought through, not for one step or the step after but for six, seven or eight steps down the line.

We can see this in the events of the 1960s and 1970s, especially surrounding the Vietnam War. Every so often, the question gets asked "How could the US have won in Vietnam?" with a series of replies that include invading the North, extending the bombing to China and other dramatic escalations of the conflict. Now, it should be obvious why such suggestions could not, in the real world, be contemplated. The risk of ending up in a nuclear war was too great. For another example, note how the presence of nuclear weapons restricted and limited the tactical and operational options available to both sides in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In effect neither side could push the war to a final conclusion because to do so would bring down nuclear attack on the heads of the "winners". Here, Israel's nuclear arsenal was limiting the conflict before it even started. Egypt and Syria couldn't destroy the country - all they could do was to chew up enough of the Israeli armed forces and put themselves in the correct strategic position to dictate a peace agreement on much more favorable terms than would be the case. But, the Israeli nucear arsenal also limited the conflict in another way. Because they were a nuclear power they were fair game; if they pushed the Egyptians too hard, they would demand Soviet assistance and who knew where that would lead?

So, the direct effects of nuclear weapons in a nation's hands is to make that nation extremely cautious. They spend much time studying situations, working out the implications of such situations, what the likely results of certain policy options are. One of the immense advantages the US had in the Cold War was that they had a network of Research Institutes and Associations and consulting companies who spennt their time doing exactly this sort of work. (Ahh the dear dead days of planning nuclear wars. The glow of satisfaction as piecutters are placed over cities; the warm feeling of fulfillment as the death toll passed the billion mark; the sick feeling of disappointment as the casualties from a given strategy only amounted to some 40 million when preliminary studies had shown a much more productive result. But I digress). This meant that a much wider range of policy options could be studied than was possible if the ideas were left in military hands. These organizations, the famous think tanks had no inhibitions about asking very awkward questions that would end the career of a military officer doing the same. This network became known as The Business. We're still out here.

So. What were nuclear weapons good for? It sems they are more of a liability than an asset. To some extent that's true but the important fact remains, they do limit conflict. As long as they are in place and functional they are an insurance policy against a nation getting beaten. That means that if that country is going to get beaten, its nuclear weapons have to be taken out first. It also means that if it ever uses its nuclear weapons, once they are gone, its invulnerability vanishes with it. Thus, the threat posed by nuclear weapons is a lot more effective and valuable than the likely results of using those weapons. Of course, this concern becomes moot if it appears likely that the NNP is about to lose its nuclear weapons to a pre-emptive strike. Under these circumstances, the country may decide that its in a use-it-or-lose-it situation. The more vulnerable to pre-emption those weapons are the stronger that imperative becomes.

This is why ICBMs are such an attractive option. They are faster-reacting than bombers, they are easier to protect on the ground and they are much more likely to get through to their targets. This is why modern, advanced bomb designs are much more desirable than the older versions. In the 1950s the Soviet Union had a nuclear attack reaction time of six weeks (don't laugh, that of the US was 30 days). The reason was simple, bomb design in those days meant that the bomb, once assembled , deteriorated very quickly and, once degraded, had to be sent back to the plant for remanufacture. Bomb assembly needed specialized teams and took time. This made a first strike very, very attractive - as long as the attecker could be sure of getting all the enemy force. It was this long delay to get forces available that made air defense and ABM such an attractive option. In effect, it could blunt an enemy attack while the assembly crews frantically put their own bombs together and got them ready for launch. As advancing bomb design made it possible to reduce assembly time, this aspect of ABM became less important.

.
 

Craiglxviii

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And to conclude that one...

What this also suggests is that large, secure nuclear arsenals are inherently safer than small, vulnerable ones. A large arsenal means that the owner can do appalling damage to an enemy, a secure arsenal means that no matter how the enemy attacks, enough weapons will survive to allow that destruction to take place. Here we have the genesis of the most misunderstood term in modern warfare - MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction. (Another point of elaboration here - MAD is not a policy and has never been instituted as a policy option. It's the effect of policies that have been promulgated). Its widely believed that this suggests that both sides are wide open to unrestricted destruction by the other. This is a gross over-simplification. What the term actually means is that both sides have enough nuclear firepower to destroy the other and that the firepower in question is protected in such ways that no pre-emptive strike can destroy enough of it to take away the fact that the other country will be destroyed. MAD did not preclude the use of defensive systems - in fact it was originally formulated to show how important they are - but its misunderstood version was held to do so - with catastrophic results for us all. One implication of this by the way is that in spite of all the fuss over the Chinese stealing the W88 warhead design, the net beneficiary of that is the United States; it allows the Chinese to build a much more secure deterrent and thus a more stable one. Also, looking at things purely ruthlessly, its better for one's enemy to make small clean bombs than big dirty ones.

Aha, I hear you say what about the mad dictator? Its interesting to note that mad, homicidal aggressive dictators tend to get very tame sane cautious ones as soon as they split atoms. Whatever their motivations and intents, the mechanics of how nuclear weapons work dictate that mad dictators become sane dictators very quickly. After all its not much fun dictating if one's country is a radioactive trash pile and you're one of the ashes. China, India and Pakistan are good examples. One of the best examples of this process at work is Mao Tse Tung. Throughout the 1950s he was extraordinarily bellicose and repeatedly tried to bully, cajole or trick Khruschev and his successors into initiating a nuclear exchange with the US on the grounds that world communism would rise from the ashes. Thats what Quemoy and Matsu were all about in the late 1950s. Then China got nuclear weapons. Have you noticed how reticent they are with them? Its sunk in. They can be totally destroyed; will be totally destroyed; in the event of an exchange. We had a Chinese Officer here once on exchange (billed as a "look what we can do" session it was really a "look what we can do to you" exercise). We got the standard line about how the Chinese could lose 500 million people in a nuclear war and keep going with the survivors. So we got out a demographic map (one that shows population densities rather than topographical data) and got to work with pie-cutters using a few classified tricks. We got virtually the entire population of China using only a small proportion of the US arsenal. Our guest stared at the map for a couple of minutes then went and tossed his cookies into the toilet bowl. The only people who mouth off about using nuclear weapons and threaten others with them are those that do not have keys hanging around their necks. The moment they get keys and realize what they've let themselves in for, they get to be very quiet and very cautious indeed.

One anayst from The Business was asked what Saddam Hussein would have done if Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990. He replied that he didn't know what he would have done but he did know what he would not have done - he would not have invaded Kuwait
 

Craiglxviii

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Next. What do we target and how do we achieve weapons effects on those targets?

Unfortunately planning a nuclear strike isn't just a matter of working out which cities to destroy. In fact it isn't even a matter of working out which cities to destroy. In fact, you don't target cities at all per se. You bomb things. First stage is to work out a series of objectives. Normally discussions of such things rotate around strategies being either counter-force or counter-city but its a lot more complex than that. At the last count there were about 30 distinct targeting strategies that could be adopted. As an example, there could be:-

Counter-military - aimed at destroying a country's armed forces. Such a strike would be aimed at things like arsenals, ports, airbases, military training sites etc

Counter-strategic - aimed at taking out a country's strategic weapons force. This would hit the ICBM silos, SSBN ports and bases, the SSBNs themselves, bomber bases, nuclear storage depots etc.

Counter-industrial - aimed at destroying key industrial assets and breaking the target country's industrial
infrastructure

Counter-energy - aimed at destroying a country's energy supplies and resources plus the means for distributing them.

Counter-communications - aimed at disrupting and eliminating the target country's communications (radio, TV, landline, satellite etc) communications systems.

Counter-political - aimed at erasing the target country's political leadership - note this is MUCH more difficult than it seems and is very dangerous. Killing the only people who can surrender is not terribly bright

Counter-population - aimed at simply killing as much of the enemy population as possible.

There are plenty of others. One of the things that gets done at this level is to think up targeting strategies, work out the target sets associated with that strategy and the resources needed to eliminate that target set. Based on that we can then work out if that particular target strategy is an effective use of resources. Note also that adopting one particular target strategy does not preclude simultaneously putting another into play.

So lets look at a typical targeting problem in an average sort of strike. We are going to give the capital of Outer Loonyistan a really thorough seeing to. Now we don't just explode a bomb in the center of the city and say bye-bye. Believe it or not that won't do any real good. Initiate a 1 megaton device over the center of London and 95 percent of the cities assets and 80 percent of the population will survive (this means that, proportionally speaking, Londoners will be better off after a nuclear attack than they were before it took place. (This was the basis of at least one Get Rich Quick scheme proposed in The Business). So we start by selecting a specific targeting strategy. Now we have to estimate the weight of attack Asylumville is likely to come under if that strategy is adopted. To do this we first work out how high Asylumville stands with regard to other potential target areas for that particular strategy. This is usually done by a careful assessment of what targets are in that area as opposed to similar target areas in other parts of the country and assuming the available warheads are distributed according to the target density in that area. Then we assess how many warheads are likely to be inbound and crank that into the priorities we've established to see how many are likely to be fired at Asylumville. It'll be a lot fewer than you think. This means is that we have to look very carefully at the city, its geography and the distribution of its assets in order to work out how to take it down.

Now we need some maps. We need a standard topographical map, demographic maps and asset/resource maps. Take the targeting strategy and the likely target set associated with it and plot them on that map. Now think out how hard that target set is going to be to destroy. The problems now become apparent. Some targets are best attacked by surface bursts, others by high airbursts. Some, very hard targets need almost direct hits to destroy them; others are so small (and so hard) that hitting them is very difficult.The sort of things we might look at hitting, depending how we do things, are communication facilities, railway marshalling yards, factories, oil refineries, government offices, military bases For example, if the target strategy is anti-communications, amongst the primary targets will be airfields and railway marshalling yards. They are notoriously difficult to destroy, the attacker needs big warheads and needs to ground burst them so the target is physically scoured from the ground. There is a lot of thought needed here; you'll find there are far more targets than warheads so you'll have to allocate the warheads one way, then try to work out the effects. To give you some idea of how that list grows, there are something like 50,000 priority nuclear targets in Russia. Some of them are weird and tucked right out of the way (one of the most critical non-military targets in the USA is where you would least expect it). Now many of that 50,000 target list will be virtually on top of eachother. One bomb will get several of them. That pulls the list down immensely, probably to around 3,000 - 5,000 targets.

OK back to working over Asylumville, the capital of Outer Loonyistan. If its like most other capitals, it'll probably merit a total of between five and ten devices to take out all the things we want to. One of the key tools used here is a thing called a pie-cutter. I've mentioned this in the past. Its a circular hand-held computer. You set the verniers on it to the specifics of the weapon used (altitude of burst, yield etc) and it gives you a series of rings that show the various lethal effects of the bomb to certain distances. Put it down on the planned impact point and you'll get what the bomb will do. You won't get a pie cutter (they are classified equipment) but you can make your own from publically available data using tracing paper and compasses. . We end up with a map of the city after being worked over. Normally, at this point somebody says. Dammit we didn't get [insert some key assets] and we start again. Your first shot at targeting will be stunningly disappointing so you play games with warhead types and yields and with burst locations until you get as many of target set as you can. Take that marshalling yard; sounds easy doesn't it? Believe me railway marshalling yards are a whirling son of a bitch to take down. They are virtually invulnerable to airbursts; we have to groundburst a blast directly on the yard. 800 yards outside and you might as well not have bothered. The problem is those yards are not that big. So now we have a problem called CEP. This stands for Circle of Equal Probability. This is a measure of the accuracy of the missile and is the radius of the circle that will contain half the missiles aimed at the center of the circle. That means that half the inbounds will fall outside that circle. Now we have a second concept; the radius of total destruction, the radius within which everything is destroyed. Its astonishingly small; for a 100 kt groundburst its about 800 yards (now see where the marshalling yard came from). Now if the RTD exceeds the CEP we're probably Ok, if it doesn't (and in most cases it doesn't) we've got problems.

What all this ends up with is we have to fire multiple warheads at single targets in order to be sure of getting them. This is a complex calculation since the optimum number of warheads for Asylumville will depend on the attack pattern and priorities. But we'll eventually end up with number that represents the best compromise between destructive effects and warhead use. To estimate the effects on the area as a whole, take your demographic map, plot the event points, altitudes and yields on that map and apply your pie-cutter set for overpressure. The overpressure needed to destroy various types of building are public record (US houses are very very soft and vulnerable) so you know roughly what will be destroyed up to a given distance. Note that the blast circles will overlap in some places. Blast also isn't logical; ground irregularities will funnel it is some directions so that an area close in may be unscathed while others much further away will be flattened.

Now we have to get them there. Missiles are not terribly reliable and a lot can go wrong. A Rectal Extraction figure suggests that only about 60 percent of them will work when the blue touchpaper is ignited. So we have to add extra warheads to allow for the duds. To give a feel for the sort of numbers that we're talking about, the British calculated that they needed 32 warheads to give Moscow a terminal dose of instant sunrise. In other words, the British nuclear deterrent took down Moscow and that was it. That's why so many devices are needed - the inventory evaporates very fast.
 

Craiglxviii

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Next thing to remember is, talking about the UK...

We have around 190 warheads generated at any one time. At any one time, no more than 48 are at sea and ready to be used (the deterrent duty "V-bomber" fleet ballistic missile submarine) with 16 missiles, each averaging 3 warheads.

That number of 190 is not random. It is pretty closely calculated and based on how many warheads it would take to overwhelm Moscow's anti-ballistic missile shield, strike and destroy the Soviet government and centres of power. This was called "The Moscow Criterion" and it is interesting to see how well it was perceived (as a deterrent)- the Soviets ran an Army-level warhame called "Seven Days to the River Rhine" in 1979. When details of this were discovered, we found out that both Britain and France (both European nuclear powers) were deliberately excluded from the enemy order of battle, i.e. it was Germany, Italy, Spain, all the rest of NATO. So, the British strategic arsenal is designed around taking out Moscow. That's it. One big city and we have shot our bolt, totally and completely.

The next thing to remember is that a modern nuclear war will be what is known a "Come as you Are" war. There will be little to no advanced warning, no time to ramp up production, lay down new ships, increase aircraft orders. It will be fought with whatever is in the inventory and that is it (that is, by the way, the biggest reason to continually upgrade, improve and replace existing kit- one never knows when it will be put to the ultimate test). This exposes a number of big issues in the West's declined defence spending since 1991, stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts have fallen considerably. NATO's theatre reserve 5.56mm stocks are running at about 3 days usage to give some idea, that is how long any conventional conflict could last at peer or near-peer level.

So the UK can fire off 48 warheads. Only, that doesn't quite translate to 48 targets due to the mechanics of MIRVed missiles. We have 16 missiles maximum, perhaps less. Each of those missiles can fire its warheads onto a fairly narrow "footprint" of ground, so we can strike no more than 3 targets in each of 16 footprints. Of course we can fire more than one missile at each footprint but the warheads will not arrive together, so if we need to multiply blast waves to create peak overpressure on a very hard target we have to focus one missile per target. That is quite an inefficient use of weapons. So the reality is that we are stuck with 16 targets that can be struck at zero warning- the First Sea Lord picks up the phone and instructs HMS VENGEANCE to commence strategic missile strikes on Outer Loonistan, for instance.

Now to the UK. Germany was once described in The Business as a series of 50kt targets, 350kt apart. That is. lots of small targets all interlinked with big ones. It's a country that is a target-rich environment. Britain, specifically England and Lowland Scotland is much, much worse. We are very densely populated, all of our major strategic targets are thickly surrounded by population and the prevailing winds mean that fallout quickly becomes a major problem, assuming that groundbursts are in the strike plan.

So remember the first essay. Strategic paralysis. Nuclear Powers must think not two or three but eight or ten steps ahead of EVERY SINGLE foreign policy decision they make. Our letting fly with the opening salvo in almost any nuclear-level conflict would quickly attract more incoming megatonnage than the country's population could withstand/ That, by the way, is why we never bothered with Civil Defence; it simply wouldn't have been worth it.
 

Wighty

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So a nuclear attack or the threat of one is imminent, its touch and go.
When do we decide to push the button....
We could fire a first salvo in a pre-emptive attack.
Discuss.
When we don't get the Brexit deal we want ;)
 

Craiglxviii

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LostKiwi

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Western Oz would be relatively safe.
NZ would be better. They have water. And sheep (for roast lamb and wool for clothing).

I actually remember reading a book by Nevil Shute called 'On the Beach' which dealt with exactly this scenario.
 

Craiglxviii

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NZ would be better. They have water. And sheep (for roast lamb and wool for clothing).

I actually remember reading a book by Nevil Shute called 'On the Beach' which dealt with exactly this scenario.

And they're downwind of some REALLY nasty fallout plumes....

On the Beach was very poorly researched by Shute- the mechanics of weapons aftereffects just don't work that way. Although, to be fair to him at the time of writing, the way in which they do work would have been doctoral- level and classified in 1957.
 

LostKiwi

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The only fallout would be from Australia taking get a few ( at least until fallout crossed thd equator).
The South Island should be relatively clear of these being more southerly than Australia (Melbourne is only 2 degrees further south than Auckland and Dunedin a massive 8 degrees further south than Melbourne).

Could always return to family roots on Pitcairn....
 

Craiglxviii

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Depends on the prevailing winds. Sydney gets a face full due to the port and naval base, Canberra will get groundburst, there's a big signals facility in Geelong that will get groundbursts. If the winds are in the right direction NZ escapes. If not the plumes (which are funnel shaped) will probably blanket the country. But then there are mountains, and air currents do very odd things with fallout. It's not an even coverage.
 

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NZ would be better. They have water. And sheep (for roast lamb and wool for clothing).

I actually remember reading a book by Nevil Shute called 'On the Beach' which dealt with exactly this scenario.
I think I heard on the news a few months ago that some of the Uber Rich are buying in NZ for exactly this reason ...to prepare for the rest of the world being decimated :eek:
 

LostKiwi

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Might explain the astronomical prices for real estate at the moment then!
 

C350Carl

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Will be interesting to see how many scorpions and cockroaches actually survive.
 

Craiglxviii

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Will be interesting to see how many scorpions and cockroaches actually survive.

Bugger all if I have anything to do with it, scorpions are a right bunch of c***s. And those ****** camel spiders.

Being serious, a nuclear war would not be an extinction level event for humanity. The population would be hard hit but survive- very strongly area or country dependent.

The real extinction level event coming onscene for humanity is biowar. There were rumours and some limited evidence of biological precursor agent manufacturing facilities in Raqqa last year; more rumours are now coming out that North Korea has gotten into the same game.
 

davemercedes

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Famous last words - peasant in field near Hiroshima 6 August 1945:
"What the fcuk's that?"​
 

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