World Views- Realism & Liberalism, or Brexit through political science.

[Craiglxviii]

I've mentioned Realism before, and it's two flavours- minimal and maximal.

I've also mentioned Liberalism, and it's need for order.

The following two short essays- not my words- are an attempt to put some of the fundamental issues surrounding Brexit in context. Today I've heard Hilary Benn on the "no deal is better than a bad deal" topic- this post will attempt to address that point.

The UK (and US) varies between Minimal & Maximal Realism as its world view, based largely on our global position for three centuries.

Europe tends towards Liberalism.

As with the following essay I have bolded out a few sentences to reflect my original point.

Some time ago, we looked at Realism, the world picture that largely drives US policy. I thought it would be interesting if we also looked at its rival world picture, one that is very common in European decision-making circles. This is the theory of international relationships known as Liberalism. I have to make some points here. Firstly, Liberalism is not used here in the sense that its used in most other circles. Here, it is simply a label that is attached to a specific theory of how nation-states interact. Secondly, what we are going to look at is a theory of how nation states to relate to each other as part of an international system. It is not a policy or a strategy but a world view whose implications, if accepted, determine strategy and policy. Finally, we are looking at practical applications of theory here. The discussions and arguments are not those that will be heard in the academic confines of a University political science course. In fact, this discussion bears about as much relationship to a University Polsci course as meatball surgery in a MASH unit does to theoretical biochemistry.

In earlier discussions we have seen how Realism sees the world as being a pyramidical structure in constant conflict with nations competing against eachother to improve their standing with regard to their neighbors and, eventually, the world. We have also seen (too briefly) that Dialecticism sees the world as a chaotic and unorganized environment in which nations interact essentially at random, changing eachother and themselves in the process. Liberalism sees the world in a different light again.

One of the basic tenets of Liberalism is that there is a basic human need to search for order and organization in the human environment. This search starts, at its lowest level, with the application of order and organization at the family level. This search is then extended upwards by the organization of families into larger groups, then those groups into communities and those communities into societies. Liberalism then proposes that those societies become nation states. However, Liberalism suggests that the basic human need to provide order and organization to the human environment extends beyond the nation state to international relations as a whole. It suggests that there is an inherent human need of people to see an extension of order and organization into the international arena and that international politics reflect this need. Therefore, according to Liberalism the basic driver of international relations and the primary cause of human interaction is to create a structured, regulated and organized system within which international relationships take place.

Liberalism sees the development of structured and organized systems at every level of human activity as being both natural and good. Thus, the extension of the structured and ordered human relations environment provided by the family to other forms of human relationships is, by definition, good. In this community, we have had many discussions over the gay marriage issue. To a Realist, the instinctive reaction is who cares, if it works it succeeds, if it doesnt it fails and its rightness is determined by whether it succeeds or fails. To a Dialecticist the issue is just another one of the random combination of issues that will turn up, neither better nor worse than any other; rightness is a meaningless concept. To a Liberalist, the principle of gay marriage is, by definition, correct since its extending structure, organization and order to a group of people who were previously excluded.

This perception of there being a basic human need for structure, order and organization and a drive to extend the structured and ordered systems to progressively higher levels of human organizations has profound effects on how Liberalism sees international relations working. Conflict at any level of society is caused by defective organization at that level of society. The very fact that conflict occurs is proof in and of itself that the structure and organization of all the parties to the conflict is flawed. If a party did not have a flawed organization and structure it would not be involved in conflict. From this it follows that any society that is involved in a conflict must be, by definition, in the wrong. Its in conflict so it must be at fault. If it corrects the faults, then it wont be in the conflict any more. Again, this comes back to the perception of basic human need starting with the family. A well-organized, well-structured family resolves any conflicts it has internally. Two well-organized, well-structured families living a neighbors do not have conflicts. Only poorly-organized, badly-structured families break up, only two such families have conflicts with eachother.

Since under Liberalism a constant search for developing an organized, structured and ordered international environment is the norm and conflict between states reflects the structural failures of both parties to the conflict, it therefore follows that there are two ways of ending an international conflict. One is to correct the defects in the societies in conflict. Since a given society can only influence and restructure itself, Liberalism proposes that the first reaction of any society entering a conflict should be to look at itself, identify the faults within itself that are leading to its participation within the conflict and correct those. Once the faults are corrected, it will no longer be involved in the conflict. Other parties to the conflict are irrelevant to its resolution; the solution to any societys participation in a conflict lies within that society itself.

Furthermore Liberalism demands that, since the need for organization, structure and order is a basic human characteristic, it follows efforts to increase their incidence are good; resistance to these aims is, by definition, bad. Since the primary means of achieving organization, structure and order are agreements and formalized arrangements, it follows that all such arrangements are good. In the Liberalism ethos, there is no such thing as a bad agreement; all agreements serve the end of bringing about a structured and organized international environment therefore all agreements are good agreements. The very fact that an agreement is an agreement outweighs any negative aspects to that agreement. It also follows that, to Liberalism any opposition to an agreement is by definition wrong and contrary to the basic demands of human nature. In fact, because Liberalism sees the bringing about of international order and organization by growing webs of agreements as being and expression of basic human nature, opposing such agreements is not just wrong, it is perverse, unnatural and proof of serious flaws in those who adopt that position. To Liberalism the cry Cant we all just get along isnt a joke or ironic; its the expression of a very profound and important truth.

The differences between the world views we have looked at come out when crises develop. To the Maximal-Realism School , a crisis is a challenge which is dealt with by defeating the challenger as quickly and publically as possible. To a Minimal Realist, a crisis is a challenge that is best met by painting the challenger as a would-be hegemon and organizing a coalition against them. To a Dialecticist a crisis is just another random event that should be manipulated in ways that bring about as many good results and as few bad ones as possible. A to Liberalist a crisis is proof positive of flaws in their own society which should be corrected, after which international agreements should be reached that bring about an end to the crisis in question. There is another aspect to this which is rather interesting. To a Realist, those who disagree with them are rivals to be put down if they become threats, to quote the Mafia, its just business, nothing personal. To a Dialecticist those who disagree are just other parts of a random anarchic universe whose opinions may or may not be useful at some time or another. However, to a Liberalist, those who hold opposing world views are denying the very basis of human nature and are evil, perverse and inhuman.

 

[Craiglxviii]

And now its corollary, Realism.

In light of my original point, I have bolded out some sentences. NB this essay was written in 2003...

The following essay describes the mechanisms by which international relations work as seen by the US administration. It is not a dscription of US policy; its a description of the world view on which US policy is based. (this thread has been edited by the removal of an argument string not related to the subject and the deletion of some other, minor, posts. The content of the posts has not been edited).

US international policy is based on the mechanistic concept of Realism. This is a conceptual term and, like most such usages, doesnt quite mean what it does in the normal world. In this context, realism is used to describe a situation of continuous conflict in which the countries of the world are constantly struggling to establish an international hierarchy, to improve their own positions in that hierarchy and to reduce the positions of others. Realism sees the world political arena as being a zero-sum game in which a win for one player necessarily means that another must suffer a loss. Under the concept of Realism this immediately draws a distinction between political and economic interactions. Economic interactions are not a zero-sum game; it is quite possible, indeed usual, for an economic interaction to benefit both parties involved. Political interactions do not do this; even if a political agreement appears to benefit both parties, there will be an unseen third party or parties whose interests are harmed. This basic conceptual position leads to an early manifestation of US policy; a firm belief that trade agreements are more productive and desirable than political agreements.

It should be noted that while realism dominates US political thinking, it is not the only theoretical construct that attempts to model political processes between nations. There are others that work from different precepts and envisage different mechanisms. In many countries, different political parties or groups will espouse different models and promote different policies as a result. The US is not one of these; both Democrat and Republican parties use the Realism model as the basis for their foreign policy. This orientation is reflected by the organizations that surround the government and its bureaucracy; the use of the Realism model is so widespread that Americans in general do not even think about it. It just is. This leads to a problem when dealing with political entities that do not espouse the Realism model. For example, some models propose a situation in which participation in international agreements is desirable as an end in itself since such agreements bring about an ordered international environment. In these models, a bad agreement is better than no agreement since a bad agreement at least creates an environment where good agreements will be accepted. To a country following a Realism model, this is absurd since any international agreement will have winners and losers and losing is bad. Therefore each agreement must be taken on its individual merits, it cannot be considered as part of a larger whole.
The domination of Realism in the US political system saw a very public manifestation in President Bushs famous you are either with us or against us comment on the war on terrorism. This was much criticized as an example of US arrogance yet the truth is quite different. In terms of the Realism paradigm, its a simple statement of fact. The War on Terrorism is a zero-sum game, there will have winners and losers; there will be no neutrals. Thus those who do not support the US position will be enhancing the possibility that the US will be a loser in that interaction and that puts them into the enemy camp.

Another aspect of Realism is the perception that there can only be a single dominant power in a political world, the Hegemon. If there are two or more Hegemons, one will eventually be displaced by the other. This process may be violent or peaceful but it will happen. How it will happen is an interesting question. Although Realism is the dominant philosophy in the US political entity, it is not a monolithic whole. The Realism philosophy is divided into two sub-groups designated Minimal-Realism and Maximal-Realism. While both these hold to the same overall tenets of Realism (the constant struggle to establish and maintain a hierarchy and the zero-sum nature of political interactions), they have very different perceptions on how these interactions are carried out.

Minimal-Realism is sometimes known as Castling after an old childrens game. It envisages the world political environment as a sandy mound with the varying nations struggling to establish themselves at the top of that mound. The various parties form a mass at varying levels determined by their strength, abilities and skill. Eventually, one member of the mass secures enough of an advantage to rise to the top and secure the summit; to become King of the Castle. According to Minimal-Realism the inevitable result of this achievement is for the lesser powers, lower down the slopes of the sand castle to form a coalition that is specifically designed to bring down the entity that has just seized the summit. We can see reflections of this belief in some comments made about the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Sometimes we see the assertion that a nation that acquires or uses nuclear weapons will immediately see the rest of the world uniting against it. This is an implicit acceptance of the Minimal-Realism model of relations; the possession of nuclear weapons automatically moves the possessor to a higher position on the san castle so those underneath form a coalition to pull them down.

From the US point of view, acceptance of Minimal-Realism has two direct implications. On one level (where the US is not the Hegemon or where the position of Hegemon is disputed) the US should be taking a lead in forming and directing coalitions to take the existing or rival Hegemon down. However, once in the position of being the undisputed Hegemon, it should be spending its efforts on watching for the formation of hostile coalitions and ensuring that they do not move from the formative to the active stage. Implicit in this assumption is that the US should not make its Hegemonic position obvious or exploit that position in overt ways. In fact, the US should not act as a Hegemon at all but continue to act as a leader of a coalition to bring down a selected target. In this perception, overt displays of power are not only undesirable but are counter-productive and detrimental to US interests. Another consequence of this construct is that the US should take part in international organizations, not because they are worthwhile or useful but to conceal its Hegemonic position and to ensure that by dominating such organizations they serve rather than oppose US interests. By now, it should be reasonably obvious that the primary stronghold of Minimal-Realism in the US body politic is the Democrat Party.

Maximal-Realism sometimes known as Bandwagoning sees the world as working in an entirely different way. It sees the Hegemonic power as occupying the summit of the international order effectively unchallenged. The other powers, recognizing the futility of challenging the Hegemon make accommodations with it; they bend to its needs and make the noises that the Hegemon will find acceptable. However, eventually a challenge to the Hegemons position is mounted. This may happen because the Hegemon has started to give the impression that its power is slipping either in real terms or in terms of ability and/or desire to use that power, it may happen because the challenger has grown more confident in its own power or has achieved supremacy in a given aspect of power politics. Whatever happens, the challenge is made. From the point of view of the Hegemon, there are now four possible outcomes, it can win-well, it can win-badly, it can lose-well or it can lose-badly. Winning-well means that the challenger is beaten promptly and effectively and ceases to be a challenge; losing-badly means that the Hegemon loses so seriously that its position as Hegemon is disastrously compromised. Winning-badly and losing-well are intermediate stages whose impact can be highly variable; it can be better for the Hegemon to lose-well than to win-badly. The effect of a challenge to the Hegemons position obviously depends on the results; a resounding defeat for the Challenger will ensure the position of the Hegemon and cause additional nations to seek accommodations and favor with that power. On the other hand, any decline in the Hegemonic power will cause the less-committed of its supporters to reconsider their positions and open the way to seeking accommodation with the challenger. If the Hegemon suffers enough defeats and its international prestige is sufficiently badly dented, more of its allies will join the bandwagon, transfer their allegiance to the challenger and the Hegemon will be toppled.

From the US point of view, Maximal-Realism also has some interesting implications. One is that the US is only secure in its position as Hegemon as long as it overtly and openly exerts that power to defend its interests and those of the nations that owe allegiance to it. Anything that dilutes the USs ability to mastermind its own affairs or weakens its ability to act in its own interests is seriously detrimental to US interests. Another is that the US has to be watchful for the rise of potential challengers and cut these down before they become serious risks. Maximal-Realism is the political equivalent of the quote to those that hath, more shall be given. It is the successful exercise of power that is important for it brings with it greater security and sets the bar higher for any subsequent challenger. Another point (and a very important one) is that the initiative lies with the Challenger, not the Hegemon. The Challenger can select the time and place of any confrontation to match its own objectives and capabilities. The Hegemon has to respond for failing to do so will sacrifice prestige and start the bandwagoning process. Vietnam was a classic example; critics of American involvement there always point to the total lack of strategic importance of the place. In Maximal-Realism terms, this misses the point completely. Vietnam was not challenged because it was strategically important; it was strategically important because it was challenged. The US lost-badly in Vietnam and the result was its displacement from the Hegemonic position in the middle and late 1970s with the assumption of the position of Hegemon by the USSR. That result was only changed by the US challenge of the 1980s that displaced the USSR. As should now be obvious, the stronghold of Maximal-Realism in the US is the Republican Party.

Much of shifts and changes in US policy can be understood in terms of the conflict between Maximal-Realism and Minimal-Realism schools of thought as can the Democrat fascination with international orders and treaties and the Republican suspicion of these. The problem that the Democrats face is that a reading of history strongly points to the predominance of the Maximal-Realism over the Minimal-Realism approach.

One example is the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. At the start of this process, Germany was a flat-broke and militarily insignificant player on the European scene. It took only a few years for it to rise to a point where it was a European hegemon. This was achieved by a series of small victories and limited advances that simultaneously enhanced its own power and diluted that of the existing Hegemon. Now, if Minimal-Realism was to prove correct, we should have seen a coalition of European powers arising to confront Germany. In fact, we dont. What we do see is the smaller countries of Europe adopting many of the outward characteristics of Nazi Germany and the foundation of fascist parties in most of the European countries. In short, those countries were bandwagoning with Nazi Germany in exactly the manner predicted by Maximal-Realism. A look at the Cold War gives exactly the same impression. In the 1950s, the US was militarily and economically predominant; the USSR had few allies and was largely isolated. It only broke out of that isolation when Kennedy allowed the US to be humiliated in Berlin and Cuba and McNamara allowed the immense US strategic superiority to wither on the vine. The 1960s were marked by a steady rise of USSR power relative to that of the USA and, with the defeat of the US in Vietnam, the US was strategically routed and lost the hegemon position to the USSR. The steady shift of other nations from a US-leaning allegiance to seek accommodations with the USSR (the most notable being the Ostpolitik of West Germany) goes hand-in-hand with that shift of power whereas if Minimal-Realism was correct, we should have seen the growth of a coalition against the USSR. The US challenge of the 1980s culminating in the destruction of the USSR replaced the USA as the world Hegemon, a position that it still holds.

This also explains the focus on Iraq at this time. Iraq as the first challenge to the US hegemony after the end of the Cold War. That challenge was defeated fast and ****** (the number of nations taking part in the coalition to defeat Iraq reflecting the strength of US hegemony). However, Iraq still continues to challenge the US Hegemony and has not been eliminated as a challenger. That is about to be corrected. However, much of the US hegemonal strength was lost by the weak and ineffectual actions of the Clinton administration (classical Minimal-Realists ) and we are paying for that now with other challengers beginning to emerge (the UN and the EU). Iraq remains the leading threat however, not least because of its links within the Moslem world. The bombings of the US embassies in Africa and the attack on the USS Cole all represented challenges to US hegemony. They were successful challenges because no effective response was made to them. As a result, the prestige of the challengers rose, that of the US fell and the challengers were emboldened to further action the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon. The destruction of Afghanistan and the elimination of six al Qaeda leaders in an SUV were both responses that restored the situation somewhat. The elimination of Iraq as a challenger is equally important in restoring the damage done during the Clinton era. In contrast, North Korea is not a problem; they do not mount an effective challenge to the US simply because no nation in its right mind wants to be associated with them. They lack credibility as a challenger so they dont count. Yet.

Maximal-Realism is a proven and demonstrated truth of international relations and it carries with it an important lesson. The rule of Maximal-Realism is when the hegemon says jump the correct response is not how high but may we come down now please. It was once suggested that this would cause us to lose world sympathy. From the Maximal-Realism this is a good thing in its own right. We dont want you to love us, we want you to be frightened of incurring our displeasure.

 

[Craiglxviii]

Now, President Obama (and Hilary Clinton) are pretty much the archetypical Minimal Realists. President Trump is probably the Maximal Realist of our times. His actions need to be seen in the context of the second essay.

OK, that's me for now, enjoy, discuss, slag off. In your own time, carry on.

 

[prwales]

We are entering a political era that is characterised by its lack of principle or of values. Cynical self interest means that the UN and similar co-operative [not excluding NATO] ventures face disintegration.

 

[Craiglxviii]

We are entering a political era that is characterised by its lack of principle or of values. Cynical self interest means that the UN and similar co-operative [not excluding NATO] ventures face disintegration.

I'd argue that a) that's correct in and of itself- with the exception of the NATO comment, but b) the last 50-60 years have been the aberration and that we are in fact returning to the internecine politics of a previous era.

Remember, nations do not have friends but shared interests. Conversely they also don't have enemies, just crossed interests. About the best that one can hope for is an agreement "not to kill each other today."

Don't mistake the US hype on NATO in the news media. The most likely change will be around Turkey. Also, read it in the context of the second essay...

 

[prwales]

The UK's Post war politicians or at least those who had lived through it were all committed to making things better for everyone irrespective of their political labels. Butskellism. Now it's naked self interest. Track it back to Thatcher or to the oil crisis if you like but there is a moral vacuum when it comes to British politics that simply didn't exist before, I think its better to decry it than to justify it.

 

[Craiglxviii]

The UK's Post war politicians or at least those who had lived through it were all committed to making things better for everyone irrespective of their political labels. Butskellism. Now it's naked self interest. Track it back to Thatcher or to the oil crisis if you like but there is a moral vacuum when it comes to British politics that simply didn't exist before, I think its better to decry it than to justify it.

All politics has, or exists in a moral vacuum. Really, to believe otherwise is just naïveté. The UK post war was a bankrupt nation struggling to find enough manpower and steel to rebuild itself and its economy, and reestablish itself on the world stage as a heavy hitting regional power with limited global reach. That was a hard road indeed. To give you some idea of the pragmatism of politics of the time, we took a look at the costs of imports from the Commonwealth, the costs of increased imports from the EEC, the political costs of walking away from Commonwealth trade vs. entering into ever deeper agreements with our recent and historic enemies, and decided to join the EEC. That's acting in naked self interest too. It all boils down to nations having neither friends nor enemies, just interests, whatever flavour you want to give it.

 

[LostKiwi]

.. the last 50-60 years have been the aberration and that we are in fact returning to the internecine politics of a previous era.

...

Sadly this is true. We have had more stability in Europe and the West over the past 50-60 years than ever before but the return to the internecine political thinking of the previous century does seem to be becoming more prevalent. I just hope it doesn't have a negative effect on the stability and prosperity we've enjoyed.

 

[Craiglxviii]

Some more thoughts on specifically Maximal Realism. As long as the Hegemon is that, then there are many benefits from being aligned with it. Not getting beaten over the head is just one of them. One of the things that makes the Hegemon the Hegemon is its ability to protect and support its allies (militarily and economically). Being seen to be supportive of those who support it is a very important part of maintaining a hegemonic position. Equally, failure to support allies and the ability of other powers to attack the hegemon's allies with impunity is disastrous - terminally so - to a hegemonic position. It's easy to identify countries that have a very close relationship with a hegemon - they are able to punch far above their weight in their particular regions. The UK is a good example (the US/UK being an interesting example of a consensual transfer of hegemony followed by an extremely close relationship), Thailand is another.

So, take a look at what we have done. We are moving away from the EU and making noises about building yet-closer ties with the US. The US is making friendlier-still noises to the UK. The US President is literally the dictionary definition of a Maximal Realist. So how does this affect Brexit?

OK, well Trump from the start has cast unfriendly eyes towards Europe. The US, under his leadership views the European power bloc as a challenger to its position as Hegemon. Either that, or as a supporter to a challenger to its hegemonistic position. So, Trump is acting to protect and support his ally (the UK) while starting to probe weaknesses in the challenger (the EU). He has realized an early success (not of his making, but it works for him) in Brexit, as this acts to both strengthen the US/ UK position and weaken the position of the challenger.

 

[Craiglxviii]

Sadly this is true. We have had more stability in Europe and the West over the past 50-60 years than ever before but the return to the internecine political thinking of the previous century does seem to be becoming more prevalent. I just hope it doesn't have a negative effect on the stability and prosperity we've enjoyed.

The one thing that didn't exist before let's say the 1930s was the ability to turn large areas of land into self-illuminating glass car parks. That in itself brings stability- remember that nuclear weapons limit the extent of war. ("We can't stop you fighting, but we can keep your war to be a small one...")

So the next question is prosperity. Specifically, GDP. That relies on trade. Now, in the essays above we have seen how Maximal Realism views trade agreements as being of fundamental importance to continued friendly co-operation between countries. Not only that, but it takes the view that agreements do not have to be zero-sum, they can both be beneficial to the parties involved (but someone else will lose out elsewhere). For the UK, that means that as we are leaving the EU we will have to find trade deals that benefit us more than no trade deals to maintain or increase our prosperity. For the US to maintain its position as Hegemon it will therefore follow logically, that to offer the UK trade deals that are specifically advantageous to the UK is a good thing (as the US will benefit in other ways, not least maintaining its position as Hegemon through supporting its supporters).

 

[LostKiwi]

The one thing that didn't exist before let's say the 1930s was the ability to turn large areas of land into self-illuminating glass car parks. That in itself brings stability- remember that nuclear weapons limit the extent of war. ("We can't stop you fighting, but we can keep your war to be a small one...")

So the next question is prosperity. Specifically, GDP. That relies on trade. Now, in the essays above we have seen how Maximal Realism views trade agreements as being of fundamental importance to continued friendly co-operation between countries. Not only that, but it takes the view that agreements do not have to be zero-sum, they can both be beneficial to the parties involved (but someone else will lose out elsewhere). For the UK, that means that as we are leaving the EU we will have to find trade deals that benefit us more than no trade deals to maintain or increase our prosperity. For the US to maintain its position as Hegemon it will therefore follow logically, that to offer the UK trade deals that are specifically advantageous to the UK is a good thing (as the US will benefit in other ways, not least maintaining its position as Hegemon through supporting its supporters).

I was actually thinking of the wider 'We' as in the UK and Europe
Whether we are part of the EU or not it will do us little good if the EU falls apart economically.

 

[Craiglxviii]

I was actually thinking of the wider 'We' as in the UK and Europe
Whether we are part of the EU or not it will do us little good if the EU falls apart economically.

****** website losing posts...

Right. Second time.

Donning maximal realist hat here... remember that politics is a zero- sum game whereas trade need not be necessarily.

Political first. If the EU is a direct challenger, or supports the direct challenger to the Hegemon, then anything which harms it must result in a benefit to someone else. If we or the Hegemon which we support have caused that harm then it is to our collective benefit.

If trade is affected then it can indeed harm us and our Hegemon.

So it follows that harming the political monolithiticity (did I invent a word there) of the EU is a good thing, while mutually- beneficial trade with it- or portions of it- is also a good thing. Thus from that it follows that fragmenting the EU, and bringing those fragments into the supporting sphere of the Hegemon by maintaining mutually beneficial trade is a good thing.

 

[LostKiwi]

In other words divide - conquer - assimilate.....
(Resistance is futile )

 

[Craiglxviii]

In other words divide - conquer - assimilate.....
(Resistance is futile )

That is Dialecticism...

 

[LostKiwi]

That is Dialecticism...

I thought it was Borgism....:wink:

 

[Craiglxviii]

Unlike "Realism" which is hierarchical in structure and "Rationalism" which is ordered in structure, dialecticism is anarchic. That is, it suggests that the international arena has no particular structure of its own and the various groups in it move around essentially at random and interacting when they meet. As a result of each interaction, each group takes on some of the characteristics of the other. So if Group A meets Group B, each goes away as Group AB. This is repeated over and over again. Two groups with conflicting characteristics meet and between them form a synthesis of their characteristics then move off to conflict with other groups, forming further syntheses with them. As a result of this process, repeated over and over again, the character of the environment is first formed then gradually changes over time.

Now when two groups interact, the extent to which they affect eachother is not necessarily equal. The extent to which each affects the other is a factor their relative power, their determination to affect the other, the extent to which they with to resist affect and the measures they take to prevent it. This means a large, powerful group that interacts with a smaller weaker group and also takes every opportunity to isolate the effects of that interaction will be much less affected by the interaction than the smaller group. Also, the more actively a group seeks such interactions, the more it will affect other groups. In such cases, the environment will slowly take on the characteristics of the powerful group and, eventually, be indistinguisable from it.

The primary believer in this model was the USSR.

 

[Craiglxviii]

In other words divide - conquer - assimilate.....
(Resistance is futile )

By the way, it's not conquer - assimilate under Realism. It's ally- support. If assimilation (US pop culture, blue jeans, British New Wave/ "second invasion") happens it's cultural not political.

 

[Craiglxviii]

I thought it was Borgism....:wink:

We had a French language teacher by the name of Halborg. Otherwise known as "resistance is futile". She was from Paisley. No one could understand a word she said in either language.

You forgot the next bit... "Your culture will adapt to service us"... does that sound like the UK or the EU?

 

[LostKiwi]

You forgot the next bit... "Your culture will adapt to service us"... does that sound like the UK or the EU?

USA....

 

[Craiglxviii]

USA....

No- they've not forced laws on monetary unions on people have they? The EU has been very active in doing so.